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ABSTRACT 
Secret-sharing schemes describe methods to securely share a secret among a group of 
participants. A properly constructed secret-sharing scheme guarantees that the share 
belonging to one participant does not reveal anything about the shares of others or 
even the secret itself. Besides being used to distribute a secret, secret-sharing schemes 
have also been used in secure multi-party computations and redundant residue number 
systems for error correction codes. In this paper, we propose that the secret-sharing 
scheme be used as a primitive in a Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
to detect attacks in encrypted networks. Encrypted networks such as Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) fully encrypt network traffic which can include both malicious and 
non-malicious traffic. Traditional NIDS cannot monitor such encrypted traffic. We 
therefore describe how our work uses a combination of Shamir's secret-sharing 
scheme and randomised network proxies to enable a traditional NIDS to function 
normally in a VPN environment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Secret-sharing schemes such as those initially proposed by Shamir [1] 
and Blakely [2] are used to securely distribute a secret among a group of 
participants. A (k, n) secret-sharing scheme is one where a single secret is 
split into n shares and any k shares is sufficient to recover the original secret 
where k < n. Secret-sharing has been used as the primitive of multi-party 
computations [3] and error correction codes [4]. In our work, we apply 
secret-sharing in a novel way to detect attacks initiated over encrypted 
networks. 
 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are based on the notion that 
computer misuse can be detected by analysing audit data in computer system 
or network. Audit data can be in the form of log files, file statuses and even 
network traffic. A host-based IDS (HIDS) operates within a host, monitoring 
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log files and system calls for signs of potential abuse while a network-based 
IDS (NIDS) monitors network traffic for malicious activities. 
 
However, if the audit data cannot be accessed due to data corruption 
or encryption, the IDS cannot function properly. Our work focuses on the 
effects of encrypted networks on NIDS operations. We are motivated by the 
growing use of encrypted networks that obfuscate network traffic between 
any two hosts in the network. An encrypted network such as a virtual private 
network (VPN) encrypts the entire network, thus completely masking traffic 
– malicious or otherwise. This can negate the protection offered by a NIDS 
because it cannot analyse encrypted traffic. 
 
In this paper, we propose a novel method of using secret-sharing to 
allow a NIDS to function properly in a VPN. It does this without 
compromising on the confidentiality and integrity afforded by the VPN 
infrastructure. 
 
RELATED WORK 
The most common approach of enabling intrusion detection in VPNs 
is to co-locate a NIDS on the VPN gateway. In this setup, the VPN traffic 
from an external host is terminated at the VPN gateway located at the 
network perimeter. At this point, network traffic is decrypted by the VPN 
gateway and subsequently given to the co-located NIDS for analysis. If the 
NIDS detects benign traffic, it allows the traffic to pass to the internal host in 
cleartext form. If the traffic is malicious, an alert will be triggered and the 
malicious traffic is dropped. Wagner [5] proposed such an approach. Despite 
that, this approach does not support an end-to-end VPN tunnel, established 
from the external host right up to the internal host. The end-to-end tunnel 
offers the greatest amount of confidentiality. 
A variant of the co-located NIDS approach is the man-in-the-middle 
approach that supports end-to-end VPN tunnels. Yamada et al. [6] suggested 
that a VPN gateway with a co-located NIDS makes two separate VPN 
tunnels – one with a host on the left and another with the host on the right. 
With the gateway sitting in between the two communicating hosts, it is able 
to relay network traffic between them with each host believing that it is 
communicating directly with the other. It relays network traffic while 
analysing the network traffic that has been decrypted at the gateway before 
encrypting it again and sending it to the other host. This approach requires 
the private keys of both hosts and implies the use of a complicated Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
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To the best of our knowledge, there are three other approaches that 
attempt to address this problem of detecting attacks over VPNs. The first 
approach uses statistical traffic analysis techniques to detect intrusions. 
Encrypted network traffic is extracted using network sniffers and then 
analysed to infer information from frequently observed patterns. Although 
network traffic is encrypted, there are still some outwardly observable 
features such as frequency and size of packets. These features can reveal 
certain trends and patterns that uniquely characterise certain attacks. Yamada 
et al. [6], Piccitto et al. [7] and Foroushani et al. [8] use statistical analysis to 
infer the presence of malicious activities in SSL and VPN traffic. Statistical 
analysis is nevertheless limited in scope due to the few traffic patterns that 
can be practically deduced solely from observing the network traffic. 
Moreover, a large volume of network traffic has to be collected and analysed 
before any obvious trends begin to emerge.  
The second approach detects misuse of network encryption protocols 
such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and IP Security (IPsec). A misuse is 
defined as a case where the internal states of these protocols do not transition 
from one state into another in an expected and predictable manner. Md. 
Fadlullah et al. [9] and Joglekar and Tate [10] proposed that whenever there 
is an unexpected transition, their intrusion detection systems assume that the 
encryption protocol is being misused and exploited for ulterior purposes. For 
the intrusion detection system to correctly identify such misuse, it must first 
have an accurate specification of a legitimately working encryption protocol. 
Any deviation from this specification is considered as an attack. However, 
the task of defining the specification is not trivial because every possible 
legitimate state must be modeled correctly. 
Both these approaches are suitable for detecting attacks in encrypted 
networks because they do not directly analyse the payload contained within 
the encrypted packet. Instead, they monitor external features for specific 
trends that are symptomatic of attacks. Despite that, an attack can evade 
detection if it complies exactly with regular traffic. This is typical of 
application-level attacks such as SQL injection and buffer overflow attacks 
where the malicious codes are contained within the payload portion of the 
encrypted packet. Only a few network packets are needed to corrupt the 
target and as such is statistically insignificant. 
The third approach addresses the inability to detect application-level 
attack by using a framework that retrieves decrypted network traffic for deep 
packet inspection. A NIDS that performs deep packet inspections examines 
the payload portion of the packet. Abimbola et al. [11] and Wang et al. [12] 
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proposed a framework where customised programs are installed into every 
network host. The program is able to extract already decrypted network 
traffic from the host and feed that into a NIDS for analysis. Although this 
approach recovers the decrypted payload for deep packet inspection, it does 
not consider the fact that the program residing in the targeted host can be 
defeated if the host is compromised. 
Although a HIDS could have been used to detect attacks propagating 
through VPNs, it has the added overhead of being intrinsically complex. A 
HIDS has to continuously monitor many distinct aspects of a host such as 
system calls and application logs to function effectively. Moreover, a HIDS 
has a local view of malicious activities and does not correlate with other 
HIDS to gauge the severity of the attack at the network level. 
We thus propose a detection framework that allows the use of deep 
packet inspection to detect attacks in VPN. The framework combines the use 
of two well-established technologies together, namely NIDS and VPN. This 
framework does not compromise on confidentiality and allows the 
establishment of end-to-end VPN tunnels. It also does not require a 
complicated PKI. 
 
OVERVIEW OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
A traditional NIDS extracts network traffic for analysis using network 
sniffers. However, if the network is encrypted using a VPN, the NIDS is 
rendered useless. As such, our approach uses a host-based approach where a 
custom network interface driver is installed on every host. The network 
interface driver is part of the detection framework that relies on a protocol 
that replicates network traffic from a sender and forwards that replicated 
traffic to both the NIDS and receiver. In other words, a copy of all network 
traffic is explicitly forwarded to the NIDS. This is achieved while preserving 
the privacy and integrity of the communication exchange. 
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Figure 1: OSI network model and the proposed detection protocol. 
 
The privacy and integrity of the network traffic is maintained because 
the proposed protocol functions on top of an underlying VPN infrastructure. 
In a VPN-enabled network, every link between network peers is encrypted 
by the VPN’s cryptographic algorithms. In Figure 1, we see that the proposed 
protocol is the topmost protocol in the network layer of the OSI model. Since 
it resides above VPN protocols such as IPsec, all network traffic that has 
been processed by the protocol is subsequently encapsulated by IPsec’s 
confidentiality and integrity algorithms. This architecture prevents unwanted 
eavesdropping or tampering by unauthorised third-parties while the payload 
is en route to its destination. More importantly, this architecture does not 
require that the VPN framework be modified in any way to accommodate the 
proposed protocol. 
 
Figure 2: Interactions between components in proposed detection protocol. 
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In our work, we propose that a Central IDS (CIDS) be used together 
with forwarding proxies as shown in Figure 2: Interactions between components in 
proposed detection protocol.. The CIDS is a traditional NIDS that performs traffic 
analysis and intrusion detection. The CIDS operates as a separate and 
dedicated host in the network. If a sender wishes to send network packets to 
a receiver, it will do so via the forwarding proxies. This traffic routing is 
achieved using the custom network interface driver that has been installed in 
the sender. The forwarding proxies in turn ensure that the network traffic is 
forwarded to the receiver and CIDS. Our protocol is summarised by the 
following principle: 
All traffic sent to a receiver by a sender must be replicated and 
forwarded also to the NIDS, without the possibility of the sender 
withholding traffic from the NIDS or forging fake traffic, and while  
maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the encrypted network. 
Although the VPN infrastructure prevents unauthorised network 
sniffing, the forwarding proxies are able to access the network packets 
relayed through them. This exposes the network packets to unwanted 
scrutiny and possible tampering while transiting through the proxies. To 
ensure confidentiality with respect to the proxies, we use secret-sharing. 
Each original packet is split into its corresponding shares and it is these 
shares that are relayed through the proxies. The use of secret-sharing thus 
ensures that the packets remain confidential without the need for a PKI. 
Secret-sharing Scheme 
Our work uses Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [1]. Without loss of 
generality, a (k, n) secret-sharing scheme represents a secret S as a set of n 
shares where S = {s1, si, ..., sn} and k < n. Knowledge of any k or more si 
recovers S while knowledge of any k - 1 or less reveals nothing. If some of 
the shares are incorrect, the original secret cannot be recovered; that is {s1', 
si', ..., sn} ≠ S. Confidentiality is thus an inherent feature of a secret-sharing 
scheme if and only if the unauthorised party or colluding parties do not have 
k or more shares. 
 
We use Shamir's secret-sharing scheme because it is straightforward to 
implement and is not computationally too intensive. The secret-splitting 
process involves evaluating the polynomial at n different points. Using the 
Horner algorithm, the polynomial can be efficiently evaluated as a series of 
linear operations. This reduces the splitting process to a complexity of O(n) 
[13]. For the secret-recovery process, the Lagrange form of the interpolation 
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polynomial is known to be quadratic with a complexity of O(n2)  [14]. 
Secret-sharing also has the property where the size of each share does not 
exceed the size of the original secret. This is an important property for our 
protocol because it ensures that each share is bounded in size and suitable for 
transmission over the network. 
 
Protocol Description 
If a sender wishes to send a message (i.e. network packet) to the receiver, the 
sender first splits the message into its corresponding shares using the secret-
sharing scheme. So, if the message to be sent is M, its corresponding shares 
are M = {m1, mi, …, mn}. The sender then sends all n shares to n proxies. 
After receiving its share, each proxy randomly chooses where to forward the 
share to. There are four possible destinations: 
 
• Forward to the intended receiver with probability Pr; 
• Forward to the CIDS with probability Pc; 
• Forward to both the CIDS and receiver with probability Pb; or 
• Drop the share with probability Pd. 
 
The receiver and CIDS can recover the message M as long as they 
each receive at least k distinct shares. The algorithm that implements the 
protocol is shown in  
TABLE 1. 
 
TABLE 1: Algorithm for sending and receiving network packets 
 
Algorithm 
1. Sender splits packet M into corresponding shares of {m1, mi, …, mn} using a (k, n) 
secret-sharing scheme; 
2. Sender selects n proxies from a pool of N proxies where n < N; 
3. Each mi is sent to one of the n forwarding proxies, pi; 
4. Proxy pi does one of the four predefined actions; 
• Forward to receiver only with probability Pr; 
• Forward to CIDS only with probability Pc; 
• Forward to both CIDS and receiver with probability Pb; or 
• Drop the share with probability Pd. 
5. If the receiver receives k or more mi’s, it recovers the packet M; and 
6. If the CIDS receives k or more mi’s, it recovers packet M for analysis. 
 
 
We now consider the case of a sophisticated attacker who is able to 
manipulate the protocol. An attacker could evade detection by 
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simultaneously sending two different types of messages; M to the target 
while M' to the CIDS. This is done with the intention of misleading the CIDS 
with forged but harmless traffic M' while the receiver receives the malicious 
traffic M. 
 
For the sake of clarity, let M be the malicious traffic and M' be the forged but 
harmless traffic. They are represented by M = {m1, mi, ..., mα} and M' = {m1', 
mj', ..., mβ'} where α + β ≤ n  and α, β ≥ k. The attacker sends both M and M' 
to the proxies in the hopes that the proxies will forward mi only to the 
receiver and the CIDS only receives mj'. 
 
Since the actions of the proxies are a-priori unpredictable the attacker will 
not know beforehand which of the n proxies will forward to whom (CIDS, 
receiver or both). It is therefore impossible for the attacker to reliably select 
which proxies should receive shares of M and which should receive M' in the 
hopes of obtaining a favourable outcome for the attacker. With this 
uncertainty, the CIDS may receive k or more shares that resolve to one of the 
following cases with the use of Shamir's secret-sharing: 
 
1. Receives only mi shares and recovers M; 
2. Receives only mi' shares and recovers M'; or 
3. Receives a mixture of both mi and mj' shares. This case results in a 
corrupted message, C. 
 
Because of the randomly behaving proxies, it is with high probability that the 
shares will arrive mixed up, resulting in the corrupted message C. When C is 
received, the CIDS knows that there has been an attempt to forge fake 
message with the intention of evading detection. Consequently, we envision 
two types of attacks that can be detected by our proposed approach. They 
are: 
• Application-level attack. Our approach is essentially a tunneling 
protocol. Network traffic, malicious or otherwise, that is received 
will always match the original content. Therefore, attacks sent 
through the tunnel can be detected by a standard NIDS. In any case, 
these attacks pose a traditional intrusion detection problem. 
• Evasion attack. These attacks attempt to evade CIDS detection in 
our context, by playing a game of chance with the random proxies. 
This can be detected if a message is corrupted upon delivery. 
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DISCUSSIONS 
As shown in Figure 1, the protocol functions at the network layer. 
Just like other network layer protocols, our proposed protocol only provides 
best-effort packet delivery. If reliable message delivery is required, a suitable 
transport layer protocol such as TCP can be used to encapsulate the message 
before handing it off to our protocol. TCP has built-in mechanisms that 
handle packet losses through retransmissions. 
 
An attacker could possibly bypass the forwarding proxies entirely and 
send its payload directly to the receiver. In an initially “clean” network, it is 
reasonable for a receiver to expect for the sender’s payload to arrive through 
the proxies. If the receiver receives the payload directly from the sender, it 
will ignore this non-compliant flow. Source address spoofing to fool the 
receiver into believing that it is receiving the payload from the proxies is also 
not possible. Peer authentication mechanism of the underlying VPN protocol 
ensures that the host is who it claims to be – sender or proxies [15]. As such, 
a malicious sender will have to comply with the protocol if it wants its 
payload to be properly delivered. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we introduce a detection framework that allows a 
traditional NIDS to perform deep packet inspection in an encrypted network 
traffic. The framework relies on a protocol that ensures all network traffic 
bound for the receiver is also sent to the NIDS for inspection. The VPN’s 
security protocols are leveraged upon to preserve confidentiality from 
unauthorized third-parties while secret-sharing is used to maintain privacy 
from the forwarding proxies. 
 
We foresee a growth in attacks propagating through encrypted 
networks in the future. Traditional NIDS will no longer be feasible to address 
this problem and must be adapted accordingly. We believe that our approach 
is one step in that direction. 
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